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Executive Summary 
A small set of metropolitan areas in the United States can be considered second-tier life 
sciences or technology regions. Kansas City is such an emerging second-tier region. 
The Kansas City metropolitan area was able to grow a small but specialized knowledge 
economy because of the presence of large firms and subsequent efforts to strengthen 
entrepreneurship. This paper presents data from twenty interviews conducted in the 
summer of 2012 with regional experts, venture capitalists, and entrepreneurs who have 
successfully raised risk capital. 
The analysis of Kansas City’s entrepreneurial community shows, first, that large firms’ 
role as incubators of entrepreneurial startup companies seems to have diminished, and 
that there are weak connections between existing large firms and entrepreneurial 
ventures. Second, entrepreneurial exits in the form of mergers and acquisitions have 
increased and a small number of cashed-out entrepreneurs are reinvesting their funds 
and becoming engaged. Yet this process seems to be still in its beginning stages. Third, 
the region’s entrepreneurial community does not exhibit strong networking and 
collaboration. Rather, entrepreneurial ventures and industry connections exist much like 
“islands of excellence” without strong interconnections. Fourth, although the availability 
of funding has increased, local entrepreneurs perceive the accessibility and availability 
of funds—and the capacity local venture investors bring to the table—as limiting factors. 
At the same time, while the number of investment groups has increased, the investor 
community is still fragmented and not well connected. Fifth, the energy and collective 
effort to improve the Kansas City entrepreneurial community has increased and 
strengthened significantly since 2006 when a similar study was conducted.  
Various groups and organizations have ensured a thickening of the entrepreneurial 
support infrastructure in the form of creation of incubators, establishment of financial 
incentives to invest in entrepreneurial ventures (i.e. angel tax credits), and the addition 
of effective mentoring and networking events. Yet the analysis of the data shows that 
Kansas City faces the drawbacks of a region characterized by organizational thinness in 
the form of weak endowment of firms and organizations that can fuel the entrepreneurial 
pipeline and a lack of interaction and networks among key members of the 
entrepreneurial community, which keeps the entrepreneurial economy fragmented. To 
overcome organizational thinness and fragmentation, this paper suggests focusing 
policy efforts on connecting key actors in the entrepreneurial economy such as existing 
large firms, entrepreneurial ventures, universities, and funding and mentoring 
organizations.  
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1. Introduction  
When Ewing Marion Kauffman founded Marion Laboratories in 1950 in Kansas City, 
Missouri, he laid the groundwork for what would later become a second-tier life sciences 
region. Little did he know that the Kansas City metropolitan region would evolve into a 
small yet specialized hub for drug development, diagnostics, clinical research, and 
animal health. The region is home to about 200 life sciences companies (Kansas City 
Area Life Sciences Institute, 2009). It ranks among the top fifteen metropolitan areas 
with the highest concentration of contract research organizations (Getz, Lamberti, 
Mathias, & Stergiopoulos, 2012) and its animal health firms account for nearly 32 
percent of total sales in the $19 billion global animal health market (Animal Health 
Corridor, 2012). Besides life sciences, Kansas City hosts a set of information 
technology (IT) firms that are known far beyond its borders: Sprint Nextel is a global 
leader in wireless telecommunication, Cerner is an internationally known health care 
information technology firm, and Garmin produces global positioning systems. Of 
course, the life sciences industry in Kansas City is not as large and vigorous as it is in 
Boston or San Francisco, and its IT industry is a far cry from high-tech centers like 
Silicon Valley or Seattle. Yet for the past six decades since the founding of Marion 
Laboratories, the region managed to grow these industries even though it lacked 
important prerequisites such as a world-class higher education system, large amounts 
of venture capital, or high levels of cutting-edge innovation. 
One of the central drivers of high-tech and life sciences sectors in second-tier regions is 
entrepreneurship and new firm formation. In second-tier regions, the formation of 
entrepreneurship capital is facilitated by the presence of large firms, which often are 
prominent leaders in their respective sectors (Mayer, 2011). My research indicates that 
large firms can, under certain circumstances, act as “surrogate universities” and spur 
the development of these regions. The most successful second-tier regions have 
managed to grow an entrepreneurial ecosystem that supports subsequent economic 
growth and development. Yet not all second-tier life sciences and high-tech regions 
manage to continuously leverage their initial advantages and foster such an ecosystem. 
They still face significant challenges that may inhibit their ability to grow a competitive 
entrepreneurial economy: they lack a world-class higher education infrastructure; angel 
and venture capital is not readily available; in some cases the regions also show low 
levels of industrial clustering; they have fragmented and thin entrepreneurial support 
institutions; and they may show a weak entrepreneurial culture. 
Kansas City is a case in point: spin-offs from Marion Laboratories—primarily during the 
1980s and 1990s—and entrepreneurial IT firms like Cerner or Sprint contributed to the 
evolution of Kansas City as a second-tier life sciences region. However, today, Marion 
Laboratories no longer exists in this form and its successor organizations have ceased 
their role as startup incubators. In addition, prominent firms like Sprint, Cerner, and 
Garmin and newly established research institutions like the Stowers Institute have not 
spurred much entrepreneurship. A study I conducted in 2006 (Mayer, 2006) attests to 
Kansas City’s potential to create an entrepreneurial economy. Yet the study also 
highlights several shortcomings in the innovation and entrepreneurial environment. 
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We do not yet have a good understanding about the process by which entrepreneurial 
economies, particularly those in second-tier regions like Kansas City, evolve and 
change over time and what policy levers can encourage entrepreneurial dynamics in 
these regions. We know a lot about pioneering regions like Silicon Valley, which 
successfully have adapted to industrial change through entrepreneurial activities 
(Breshnahan & Gambardella, 2004; Kenney, 2000; Lecuyer, 2005; Lee, Miller, Hancock 
Gong, & Rowen, 2000; Saxenian, 1994).  
In analyzing the case of Kansas City, this paper is guided by the following research 
questions: 
 How has the entrepreneurial economy in Kansas City changed over the past six 
years? 
 What role do large hub firms play today in facilitating entrepreneurial dynamics? 
 In what ways are entrepreneurs networked with others in the region? 
 In what ways has the region facilitated entrepreneurial dynamics? 
 How has the entrepreneurial culture and support infrastructure changed over the 
past years? 
The motivation for this study is threefold. First, it seeks to widen the understanding of 
entrepreneurial economies to include second-tier regions, and specifically to explain 
changes that take place in the entrepreneurial economy and its support system in an 
environment not well endowed with factors that seem to be critical for economic 
success. Second, the study will enable the comparison of data gathered in 2005 with 
data gathered in 2012. This will allow for an evolutionary perspective and provide the 
opportunity to highlight ways in which the economic landscape evolves over time. Such 
an evolutionary perspective fits with recent discussions in evolutionary economic 
geography about the role of entrepreneurship in regional economic change (R. Martin, 
2010). Finally, the study is motivated by the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation’s 
interest in gaining a more in-depth understanding of its home region. Ewing Marion 
Kauffman, the founder of Marion Laboratories, started the Kauffman Foundation in the 
mid-1960s at a time when he had successfully established his pharmaceutical firm in 
Kansas City. His goal was to help foster an entrepreneurial economy and improve 
communities. Thus, understanding the factors that lead to changes in the 
entrepreneurial economy of second-tier regions like Kansas City is a central task of the 
foundation and critical to its future in the Kansas City region.   
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: The next section discusses the state 
of knowledge about different models of regional development in second-tier regions and 
the role that entrepreneurship plays in them. This is followed by an overview of the case 
study, research questions, and methodology. The paper then presents empirical 
evidence relating to the Kansas City entrepreneurial economy, and concludes by 
reflecting on the particular characteristics of Kansas City’s entrepreneurial economy and 
how it changed, and on the reasons for this change. In addition, the paper discusses 
implications for the Kauffman Foundation and outlines policy recommendations. 
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2. Second-Tier Regions: Different Models of Development 
Second-tier regions like Kansas City have not received much attention in the literature 
about regional high-tech development. Most studies have focused either on the largest 
metropolitan areas that also function as global or world cities, such as New York, or on 
leading high-tech centers like Silicon Valley. Yet second-tier regions should not be 
completely forgotten in regional economic analyses for two reasons: first, second-tier 
regions play an important role in stabilizing a nation’s polycentric urban system, and 
second, some second-tier regions have emerged as viable locations for specialized 
high-tech industries. Markusen and DiGiovanna (1999) define second-tier regions as 
“spatially distinct areas of economic activity where a specialized set of trade-oriented 
industries takes root and flourishes, establishing employment and population-growth 
trajectories that are the envy of many other places.” There are many examples of up-
and-coming second-tier regions in the United States. Portland, Oregon, has managed to 
grow a specialized semiconductor and electronics industry as well as a dynamic cluster 
of active wear and outdoor gear firms (Mayer, 2012b; Mayer & Cortright, 2011). In 
Boise, Idaho, a small yet specialized high-tech industry grew around two large high-tech 
firms (Mayer, Forthcoming). Colorado Springs, Colo., utilized the presence of military 
facilities to attract electronics branch plants (Mia Gray & Markusen, 1999). Kansas City 
also can be described as a second-tier region (Mayer, 2011). These examples illustrate 
that smaller metropolitan areas can foster clusters of specialized knowledge industries. 
There are a variety of ways in which these second-tier regions have emerged, and as a 
result there are different models of regional high-tech development. However, 
traditionally scholars and policymakers have utilized the Silicon Valley model, which is 
described as an industrial district or a cluster of many, often small, firms embedded 
within strong cooperative networks. Markusen (1996) describes this type of district as a 
Marshallian industrial district and notes that there is substantial intradistrict trade among 
buyers and suppliers; that key investment decisions are made locally within the district; 
that the labor market is highly flexible and internal to the district; and that specialized 
sources of finance, technical expertise, and business services are available to firms in 
the district. Saxenian (1994) has analyzed the Silicon Valley model and notes that the 
culture of trust and cooperation, as well as the ways in which firms adopt strategies of 
flexible specialization and networking, contribute to Silicon Valley’s success. The Silicon 
Valley model, however, seems to be an exception rather than the norm in regional high-
tech development. For example, efforts to replicate this model have always failed 
(Leslie & Kargon, 1996). In addition, Silicon Valley may not be the ideal to which other 
regions should aspire when it comes to equitable and sustainable growth and 
development because of the persistent presence of income inequalities, high housing 
costs, increasing inability of the public sector to finance public services, and a sprawling 
metropolitan region (Joint Venture Silicon Valley, 2012).   
Markusen and her colleagues (Markusen, Lee, & DiGiovanna, 1999) argue that fast-
growing second-tier regions do not have to follow this Silicon Valley model. Rather, 
large firms, branch plants, or government institutions also can play an important role in 
shaping development trajectories of second-tier regions, and these regions might 
flourish even though they lack strong local cooperation and networking. Markusen et al. 
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(1999) present three other models of regional development: the hub-and-spoke 
industrial district, the satellite industrial platform, and the state-anchored industrial 
district. In reality, however, each second-tier region might combine elements of these 
idealized types, which are briefly described in the following paragraphs. 
In the hub-and-spoke industrial district a small number of key firms, which often are 
large and dominant in their respective markets, act as anchors or hubs of the regional 
economy. A classic example of a hub-and-spoke district is Seattle, Washington, where 
the aerospace industry and the software industry are anchored by Boeing and Microsoft 
(Mia  Gray, Golob, & Markusen, 1996). The hub firms have substantial linkages to 
outside suppliers and competitors. Local linkages are limited to a small set of suppliers, 
and hub firms mainly sell to outside customers. Hub firms create a critical mass of 
specialized labor and business services, which in turn benefits emerging entrepreneurial 
firms. Hub firms also can be the incubators of entrepreneurial firms.  
The satellite platform district describes a region that hosts branch facilities of externally 
based firms. In the United States, examples of this type of district include the Research 
Triangle Park in North Carolina and Elkhart, Indiana (Markusen et al. 1999). The 
Research Triangle Park started when R&D branch plants of IBM and the National 
Health Institutes located in the region. The success of the satellite platform district 
depends on the decisions made at the headquarters of the branch plants. Branch plant 
facilities generally do not engage in connections or networks with other firms in the 
region. Over time, however, the satellite platform may evolve through the attraction of 
suppliers or other firms, and entrepreneurial activity may increase. This was the case, 
for example, in the French region Sophia Antipolis, where the district evolved from one 
characterized by unconnected branch facilities to one more cooperative and 
entrepreneurial (Longhi, 1999).  
The third model is called the state-anchored industrial district and it describes regions 
that benefit from the location of a public institution such as a military base or major 
university. Colorado Springs is a good example of a state-anchored industrial district 
because the region benefitted from the location of a number of military facilities (an 
army base, air force facility, and the Air Force Academy). Regions with large universities 
also may fall into this category. Examples include Boulder, Colo., Austin, Tex., or Ann 
Arbor, Mich. The state-anchored industrial districts benefit from, but also depend on, 
public investments. A supplier industry might develop around the state anchors, but 
entrepreneurship does not play a large role unless technology transfer activities (in the 
case of regions with major universities) facilitate new firm creation. 
The Silicon Valley model should be viewed as the exception, according to Markusen et 
al. (1999, 40), who argue that “most rapidly growing metropolitan areas owe their 
performance to hub firms or industries, satellite platforms, state anchors, or some 
combination thereof.” Thus, analyses of second-tier regions have to pay attention to 
these different models. In addition, regional economies may function according to a mix 
of these idealized types. In Kansas City, for example, firms like Marion Laboratories, 
Sprint, or Cerner may have functioned or may still function as hub firms. Yet the 
successor firms of Marion Laboratories that still are present in Kansas City (i.e. 
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Quintiles) are branch operations of firms headquartered elsewhere, and may function as 
anchors of an economy that now is more characterized by a satellite platform.  
Evolution of second-tier regions 
A question of interest to scholars and policymakers relates to the ability of second-tier 
regions to evolve and maintain their development dynamics. Markusen et al. (1999) 
note that districts can evolve from one type to another. For example, a state-anchored 
district could attract new hub firms and evolve into a hub-and-spoke district. 
Alternatively, a hub-and-spoke district may evolve into a more Marshallian-type district if 
it loses its hub firm and if entrepreneurial firm formation processes take root. 
One aspect critical to the evolution of a second-tier region is the necessary change from 
an inert to an active entrepreneurial system (Feldman, 2001). Thus, a formerly sparse 
environment for entrepreneurship becomes munificent if there are forces that encourage 
new firm formation (Dubini, 1989). What factors can contribute to changing the 
entrepreneurial environment? According to Feldman (2001), the region must provide 
opportunities for individuals to recognize the entrepreneurial potential and act upon it. 
Individuals in the region must decide to engage in the formation of a company. Such a 
decision may also be referred to as the entrepreneurial event (Shapero, 1984). If such 
entrepreneurial events take place repeatedly, and if an entrepreneurial support system 
starts to emerge, second-tier regions like Kansas City can accumulate entrepreneurship 
capital. Audretsch and Keilbach (2004) describe entrepreneurship capital as follows: 
By entrepreneurship capital of an economy or a society we mean a regional milieu of 
agents that is conducive to the creation of new firms. This involves a number of 
aspects such as social acceptance of entrepreneurial behavior but of course also 
individuals who are willing to deal with the risk of creating new firms and the activity 
of bankers and venture capital agents that are willing to share risks and benefits 
involved. Hence, entrepreneurship capital reflects a number of different legal, 
institutional, and social factors and forces. Taken together, these factors and forces 
constitute the entrepreneurship capital of an economy, which creates a capacity for 
entrepreneurial activity. 
In second-tier regions, the formation of entrepreneurship capital is facilitated by the 
presence of large anchor firms, branch plants, or state anchors. There are several 
regions that have utilized the presence of large firms in the creation of a more 
networked, entrepreneurial economy (Mayer, 2009): in Portland, for example, a leading 
firm in the test and measurement market (Tektronix) was the source of many spin-offs. 
Highly skilled and capable employees left Tektronix, especially in the 1980s and 1990s, 
because the firm went through corporate crisis, downsizing, and reorientation. They 
founded many new ventures, which in turn shaped the region’s high-tech specialization. 
In Boise, Hewlett-Packard established a branch operation in the late 1970s. Over the 
years, HP contributed to the region’s emergence as a second-tier region through spin-
off processes. However, the extent to which large firms, branch plants, or state anchors 
facilitate entrepreneurship in second-tier regions depends on a variety of factors, 
including the sector, the culture of the institutions, regulations such as noncompete 
enforcements, and corporate changes that take place. 
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Limiting Factors of Second Tier Regions That Hinder Entrepreneurship 
Second-tier regions face a number of challenges when it comes to building this 
entrepreneurship capital. Similar to peripheral and rural regions, these second-tier 
regions often lag behind core regions in terms of their innovation and entrepreneurial 
systems. Several authors have described characteristics of peripheral regions (Doloreux 
& Dionne, 2008; Karlsen, Isaksen, & Spilling, 2011; Lagendijk & Lorentzen, 2007; 
Tödtling & Trippl, 2005), some of which also can help describe the limiting factors 
second-tier regions are facing.   
Peripheral regions show low levels of clustering and they often do not have significant 
supporting institutions such as universities, entrepreneurial support groups, etc. Tödtling 
and Trippl (2005) refer to such situations as “organizational thinness.” As a result, 
peripheral regions are less innovative and less dynamic in terms of new firm creation. 
However, the center-periphery relationship is dynamic, and regions can move between 
the center and periphery. To do so, they have to overcome some of the implications 
resulting from the described shortcomings. Like peripheral regions, some second-tier 
regions also can suffer from organizational thinness. Often, second-tier regions are 
home to a few anchor institutions such as large firms, branch plants, or public-sector 
organizations. In some cases, these anchor organizations can induce local clustering. 
However, if for example large anchor firms are oriented toward external markets (like 
those firms in a hub-and-spoke industrial district (Markusen, 1996)), their ability to 
create a local cluster is limited. Low levels of clustering also may imply a lack of 
interaction and networking among the region’s firms. This is referred to as 
“fragmentation” of the regional system (Tödtling & Trippl, 2005). In second-tier regions, 
networks between smaller entrepreneurial firms and large corporations may be weak 
and characterized by fragmentation.  
Weak clustering and thin institutional environments influence entrepreneurship 
dynamics. If there are only a few large firms, they may be able to act as incubators for 
spin-offs. However, the region heavily relies on a small set of firms that are critical as 
sources of entrepreneurship. Such reliance can create vulnerable situations, particularly 
when the large firms cease to play the role of incubators due to corporate changes. In 
addition, second-tier or peripheral regions often specialize in more traditional industries 
with little cutting-edge R&D and innovation activities (Tödtling & Trippl, 2005). Tödtling 
and Trippl (2005, 1210) argue that the “emphasis is on incremental innovation and on 
process innovation.” This in turn may also impact the levels of entrepreneurship. 
Second-tier regions also face difficulties in accessing venture financing. Entrepreneurs 
in second-tier regions must convince investors not located in the region of their 
ventures’ viability. Prominent venture capitalists often are located in core regions and 
tend to invest their funds locally (Kenney & Florida, 2000). Oversight and engagement 
of venture capitalists often requires close physical proximity and second-tier regions 
might be at a disadvantage because they are not the central location of the venture 
capital industry. Factoring against second-tier regions are the lack of local funders and 
the tendency of outside investors to be cautious about investments outside their home 
market.  
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Second-tier regions also may lack entrepreneurship capital. In particular, fewer 
individuals may exist who can play a critical role as dealmakers in the entrepreneurial 
economy. Feldman and Zoller (2012) define dealmakers as “individuals with valuable 
social capital, who have deep fiduciary ties within regional economies and act in the role 
of mediating relationships, making connections and facilitating new firm formation” (p. 
24). Because social capital is an important component of an active entrepreneurial 
system, a region’s ability to leverage dealmakers is important. In core regions such as 
Silicon Valley and Boston, dealmakers are well networked with each other in one 
primary network. “In less developed economies, the dealmaker networks are not 
commonly connected and are often split into many firm-actor sub-networks” (Feldman 
and Zoller 2012, 34). Second-tier regions like Kansas City may be characterized by 
fragmented dealmaker networks. 
The same may be the case for the entrepreneurial support system. Mayer (2011) notes 
that second-tier regions might be characterized by fragmented entrepreneurial support 
systems if they do not succeed in shifting toward entrepreneurial embeddedness. In 
addition, second-tier regions may not show high levels of entrepreneurial recycling. 
Mason and Harrison (2006) note that acquisitions and mergers can trigger the process 
of entrepreneurial recycling “in which the entrepreneurial team typically leave their 
company either immediately or soon after the sale and channel a proportion of their 
newly acquired wealth and time as well as their accumulated experience into other, 
often multiple, entrepreneurial activities with clear economic benefits” (p.58). 
Entrepreneurial recycling features prominently in Silicon Valley, where even high failure 
rates trigger new firm creation and “repeat” entrepreneurs continuously create new 
things (Bahrami & Evans, 1995). Entrepreneurial recycling is facilitated by a supportive 
culture that is accepting of failure and sees in entrepreneurship a viable career option.  
Table 1 highlights several characteristics of the entrepreneurial dynamics of second-tier 
regions. 
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Table 1: Entrepreneurial Characteristics of Second Tier Regions 
Sources of 
entrepreneurship 
Few large, often prominent firms, branch plants, or state 
anchors can function as incubators for new ventures. In 
hub-and-spoke and branch plant districts, universities are 
less likely to be the source of spin-offs. 
Existing large firms Often the source of entrepreneurial ventures, but often 
may not be engaged with them (i.e. as customers). 
Getting the business 
started 
Entrepreneurs often may bootstrap their firm in a second-
tier region because a critical mass of local finance and 
business services has not yet developed. They often may 
use formal sources of information and advice instead of 
informal, localized sources. 
Markets and customers Markets and customers mostly outside the region. Often 
serendipitous contacts via personal networks, fairs, 
events, etc. facilitate contact with customers. The first 
customer may be very important to float the startup. 
Innovation Firms and entrepreneurs may focus primarily on 
incremental, process innovation; there may be few firms 
that develop completely radical, new ideas. The 
development of radical, new ideas also may be confined 
to hub firms or state anchors. 
Agglomeration economies Second-tier regions do not provide many agglomeration 
economy advantages due to their limited size. 
Entrepreneurial firms may have to work hard to access 
advantages arising from agglomeration economies. 
Networks Second-tier regions may not have strong networks that 
help entrepreneurs gain access to information and 
resources. These regions often are characterized by weak 
clustering (organizational thinness). Personal networks 
seem to be more important than networks arising from the 
cluster or agglomeration economies. 
Financing Friends and family often are the most important source for 
financing the startup in a second-tier region. Institutional 
capital inside and outside the region may be hard to 
access. 
Entrepreneurial exits Few entrepreneurial exits are happening, and those that 
are may receive great recognition. Emerging second-tier 
regions have entrepreneurs who went through exits and 
are becoming engaged as investors or mentors. 
Regional culture Low acceptance of entrepreneurship as a career option 
and less-developed culture of entrepreneurial risk taking. 
This may change as more entrepreneurs develop their 
ventures and illustrate how it is possible to take risks. 
Entrepreneurial support Emerging second-tier regions may show many, often 
unconnected and fragmented efforts to improve the 
entrepreneurial environment (fragmentation). 
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Examining the limitation of second-tier regions is important because insights into these 
limiting factors will help us understand how these regions change and evolve. In 
particular, the role of large firms, branch facilities, or state anchors as transformative 
agents is important for the development of second-tier regions. Large firms can function 
as incubators of spin-off firms. New insights from evolutionary economic geography 
note that large, dominant firms help facilitate spin-offs, and through this spin-off process 
specialized clusters can develop (Klepper, 2001a, 2001b). Thus, the relationship 
between large firms and new firm formation will be key to the evolution of second-tier 
regions. Second-tier regions also change due to entrepreneurial churning, so 
entrepreneurial exits and associated reinvestments by cashed-out entrepreneurs may 
facilitate these regions’ development. Examining the ways in which firms, 
entrepreneurs, and other economic actors such as universities, research institutes, etc. 
are networked in a second-tier region may also be important. Strong networking and 
cooperation may facilitate entrepreneurship in these second-tier regions; it also may 
facilitate access to venture capital and other sources of business information necessary 
to start and grow a firm. Second-tier regions may also evolve because the 
entrepreneurial support environment changes and may become more supportive of 
entrepreneurship. Taken together, these aspects may facilitate a second-tier region’s 
ability to become more entrepreneurial and to change its status in the hierarchy of high-
tech regions. 
3. Kansas City as a Second-Tier Region 
Kansas City can be characterized as a second-tier region as defined by Markusen and 
DiGiovanna (1999). The regional economy is fairly stable and usually not characterized 
by great cyclical shifts. In the Kansas City metropolitan region, there are a small number 
of specialized industry concentrations such as the life sciences industry, which includes 
firms specialized in drug development, diagnostics, clinical research, and animal health. 
The region is home to about 200 life sciences companies (Kansas City Area Life 
Sciences Institute, 2009) and it ranks among the top fifteen metropolitan areas with the 
highest concentration of contract research organizations (Getz, et al., 2012). Its animal 
health firms account for nearly 32 percent of total sales in the $19 billion global animal 
health market (Animal Health Corridor, 2012). Besides life sciences, Kansas City hosts 
a set of information technology (IT) firms known beyond its borders: Sprint Nextel is a 
global leader in wireless telecommunication, Cerner is an internationally known health 
care information technology firm, and Garmin produces global positioning systems. 
Other significant concentrations include engineering firms such as Black & Veatch and 
Burns & McDonnell. Yet, as Table 2 highlights, Kansas City ranks behind such high-
tech centers as Silicon Valley or Boston, and the region is less specialized than other 
second-tier regions such as Portland or Boise. 
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Table 2: Comparison of High-Tech Regions 
 
 
 
Portland Boise Kansas 
City 
San 
Francisco 
& San 
Jose 
Boston 
High-Tech Industry      
High-Tech Employment, 
2005 
  58,646 18,969  49,918  375,413 218,392 
Number of High-Tech 
Firms, 2005 
   5,614   1,335    4,850   23,003  14,357 
Location Quotient, 2005     1.35      1.76      1.14      3.27      1.96 
Entrepreneurship      
Total Number of High-Tech 
Firm Births, 1998–2000 
      24       23       71      622       297  
Venture Capital Deals per 
1,000 People, 2000–2005 
     6.2      1.0       2.2      58.1      35.5  
Innovation & Research      
Total Industry R&D 
Funding, $M, 2000–2005 
$2,087 $506 $662 $44,862 $26,422 
Total University R&D 
Funding, $M, 2000–2005 
 $123   $42   $163   $10,480   $7,930  
Patents per 1,000 People, 
1990–1999 
    260      241        40     2,126       223  
Source: Mayer (2009). Specific sources are County Business Patterns, U.S. Census; Small Business 
Administration; National Science Foundation; and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. The data was 
compiled for the respective metropolitan statistical areas. 
 
Yet Kansas City is a good case that allows us to examine the role of large firms, the 
ways in which large firms contribute to entrepreneurship and connect with new firms, 
and the ways in which entrepreneurial processes evolve and are supported. Here, a 
focus on major companies that either played a role in the past or still are present in the 
region will be important. The following analysis will pay attention to past and present 
large employers such as Marion Laboratories, Sprint, Cerner, and the Stowers Institute 
of Medical Research. The firms were selected because data collected in the 2006 study 
point to their critical role as anchor institutions for their respective sectors. 
4. Research Questions and Methodology 
This paper is a continuation of a research effort that began in 2005 when I started to 
study Kansas City as a second-tier region. From 2005–7, I conducted in-depth 
interviews with thirty-two entrepreneurs, policymakers, and industry experts in Kansas 
City. This past research focused on the role of large firms and research institutions as 
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sources for entrepreneurship and the characteristics of the entrepreneurial milieu. Key 
findings of this research (Mayer, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2011) included supporting evidence 
about the key role of Marion Laboratories as the source of about sixteen spin-off firms 
mainly in life sciences and its role in the development of a specialized labor pool. The 
interviews also highlighted the limited role of other firms and institutions such as the 
Stowers Institute, Sprint, Cerner, and Garmin. Interviewees agreed on the significant 
shortcomings in the entrepreneurial support system (particularly with regard to venture 
financing, the lack of clustering and networking, etc.), yet also the region’s potential in 
the life sciences industries. An interesting finding at the time was the resolute but often 
unconnected efforts with which local policymakers and entrepreneurs tried to improve 
the region’s entrepreneurial environment. 
In June 2012, seven years after conducting these first interviews, I went back to Kansas 
City to conduct additional interviews about the ways in which the region has changed. 
The research presented in this paper draws on twenty in-depth interviews with 
entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, and entrepreneurial support organization 
representatives. Of the twenty interviews, twelve were with entrepreneurs who either 
were successful in raising venture capital funds between 2005 and 2011 or who were 
listed on the Inc. 500 or Inc. 5000 lists. Some of the entrepreneurs also were 
participants in a regional entrepreneurial support and mentoring program called 
Pipeline. Two interviews were with venture capitalists, one was with a representative of 
a major research institution, and five were with representatives from entrepreneurial 
support organizations. The latter group has a good perspective as regional experts 
knowledgeable about the region’s innovation and entrepreneurship support 
environment. The entrepreneurs who were interviewed all were founders of their firms 
and represent the life sciences and information technology industries. We excluded the 
animal health, plant and crop sciences firms because many are large multinational 
corporations, and the geographic focus of this cluster is in a small community north of 
Kansas City (St. Joseph, Mo.). It is important to note that twenty interviews give limited 
insights into the broader entrepreneurial community. However, since the entrepreneurs 
represent firms that have shown some kind of success (either through receiving venture 
and/or angel investments, and/or being on the Inc. lists), I believe their opinions provide 
interesting and relevant insights into questions about high-risk entrepreneurial 
development in a second-tier region. 
The interviews lasted between forty-seven and eighty-six minutes and were recorded 
and transcribed. The interview questions covered a range of topics particularly in regard 
to the entrepreneurs’ motivations for starting their firms, and their backgrounds as they 
relate to their firms’ location in Kansas City. In addition, the interview questionnaire 
included a question about collaboration and business partners within Kansas City and 
outside the region, the ways in which Kansas City as a second-tier location helps or 
hinders their business, perceptions about changes in the entrepreneurial environment, 
reasons for these changes, and challenges and opportunities for Kansas City as a 
second-tier region. Additional information from corporate reports, websites, industry 
information, and data about the region’s life sciences and high-tech industries 
complement the qualitative data. 
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The results presented are limited by a few methodological considerations. I only 
interviewed fairly successful, established entrepreneurs who were (despite their second-
tier location) able to raise venture capital or grow their firm to be included on the Inc. 
lists. Such a focus may introduce a bias in the results because I did not include more 
nascent entrepreneurs who have not been able to raise venture capital or grow their 
firm to receive national attention. In addition, I only conducted twenty interviews. The 
small number of interviews may limit the ability to generalize the results. I did not 
interview representatives at the large firms (Sprint, Cerner, Garmin, etc.). However, I 
chose to focus the methodology in this way because I wanted to assess whether 
Kansas City has been able to develop a more supportive entrepreneurial environment. 
Successful entrepreneurs can be considered the pioneers in a second-tier region, and 
their insights may help us understand what it takes to start a firm and to successfully 
grow it. These firm founders represent the region’s entrepreneurship capital. 
An important focus of the study was on the role of large firms in facilitating 
entrepreneurial spin-offs and in networking with existing entrepreneurial ventures. This 
analysis is limited because of the nature of a small qualitative sample. A more 
systematic analysis of the genealogy of entrepreneurial firms in the Kansas City region 
is necessary, not only to examine the extent to which large firms played a role as 
incubators, but also to find out more about the phases in which these firms may have 
helped seed startup activity. In addition, a more in-depth analysis of the culture and 
structure of these large firms and the institutional environment (i.e. noncompete 
regulations, etc.) is necessary. 
The following sections present general trends and common themes that emerged in all 
interviews, which is also an indicator of their validity.  
5. Analysis of Qualitative Data 
5.1 The Role of Large Firms in the Entrepreneurial Economy 
Large Firms Do Not Feed the Entrepreneurial Pipeline 
Kansas City emerged as a second-tier high-tech and life sciences region because of the 
presence of a number of large firms (Mayer, 2006). The region has a tradition of 
successfully growing big companies such as Hallmark Cards, KC Southern, H&R Block, 
DST, Tension Envelopes, etc. So the region has traditionally been home to successful 
entrepreneurs who can grow large companies in various sectors.  
In particular, the region’s life sciences industry started in 1950 with the founding of 
Marion Laboratories, a firm that specialized in bringing pharmaceutical products through 
the regulatory approval process and into the market. Kansas City is also home to 
internationally known technology and telecommunications firms such as Cerner, 
Garmin, and Sprint. Marion functioned as an incubator of spin-off firms, particularly in 
the 1980s and early 2000s. Yet other large firms did not influence entrepreneurial firm 
formation. As a result, unlike in other second-tier high-tech regions where such large, 
innovative, and often industry- or market-dominant firms facilitate continued economic 
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development through spin-offs (Mayer, 2011), Kansas City has not benefitted much 
from their influence on regional entrepreneurial dynamics.  
The research suggests that large firms in Kansas City do not spur entrepreneurial 
activity. Interview partners noted that these firms neither are the major source of spin-
offs, nor do they have a culture that would facilitate entrepreneurship:  
I wouldn’t say any of those are generating a lot of entrepreneurial activity. 
(Entrepreneurial Support Organization Manager 5) 
These big companies are not going to have a culture of ‘hey join us, learn a ton’ and 
you will start and leave. (Venture Capitalist 2) 
When asked about the track record of the large firms as incubators for spin-offs, the 
interview partners could only think of a handful of spin-offs that emerged from Kansas 
City’s large firms (e.g. Mobile Symmetry from Sprint, OsteoGeneX from Stowers, or 
BATS from Cerner). While this question needs further systematic investigation, we can 
note that with the exception of Marion Laboratories, firms like Cerner, Garmin, Sprint, or 
research organizations like the Stowers Institute do not play a significant role in feeding 
Kansas City’s entrepreneurial pipeline. Successful high-tech regions such as Silicon 
Valley or Seattle, however, and also other second-tier regions like Portland, illustrate 
how large firms can be the wellspring of entrepreneurial activity (Brittain & Freeman, 
1986; Mayer, 2012b). Large firms can function as incubators for spin-offs, and clusters 
often form through these spin-off processes (Klepper, 2001a, 2001b, 2009). Yet, in 
Kansas City, spin-offs originating from large firms seem to happen only sporadically and 
in limited ways. 
The track record of the select number of large firms illustrates their limited importance, 
as will be outlined in the following. Some spin-off activity originated with Marion 
Laboratories. In the decades following its founding, Marion experienced successful 
growth and diversification through acquisitions of related companies. During the 1970s, 
however, the firm’s performance declined and it started to divest non-core business 
units. During the 1980s and 1990s, several mergers, acquisitions, and divestitures took 
place.2 As a leader in drug development, Marion Laboratories attracted talented 
employees who developed specialized expertise in drug development and testing, 
regulatory approval, and market research, and who in turn discovered entrepreneurial 
opportunities. From 1950 until 2005, about sixteen spin-offs were founded by 
employees of Marion Labs or its successor companies (Mayer, 2006, 2011). Some 
interviewees highlighted the important role Marion Laboratories played in terms of 
creating spin-offs, but they also emphasized that this wellspring of entrepreneurial 
                                                          
2
 In 1989, Marion Laboratories merged with Dow Chemical to form Marion Merrell Dow, and in 1995 it 
was acquired by Hoechst to become Hoechst Marion Roussel. In 1998, the North Carolina-based 
company Quintiles Transnational bought the drug development and approval operation of Hoechst Marion 
Roussel. In 1999, Hoechst merged with Rhone-Poulenc to form Aventis. What is left of Marion 
Laboratories are the divisions operated by Quintiles and by Sanofi-Aventis, which together employ about 
1,175 people (950 at Quintiles and 225 at Sanofi-Aventis). Sanofi-Aventis eventually will close its 
operation in Kansas City by 2016. 
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activity has not continued through today with its successor firms and might not in the 
future. Specifically, Marion’s impact on entrepreneurship in the region was strongest 
during the 1980s and during the early 2000s. Today, the successor firms of Marion 
Laboratories do not play a role in facilitating new firm creation. The following comment 
alludes to Marion’s importance, but also to its decline and the role entrepreneurial 
support networks like Pipeline play today compared to large firms: 
I do think the single largest, the single most powerful entrepreneurial legacy in the city is 
Marion, but I would say that the second largest and probably soon-to-be more important 
one is the Pipeline network. (Life Sciences Entrepreneur 3) 
While the entrepreneurs who started the Marion-related spin-offs were able to use 
business expertise they gained while working at Marion Laboratories, their 
entrepreneurial efforts to start new ventures either took place outside the region or in a 
Kansas City-specific environment that was not well endowed with factors in support of 
entrepreneurship, as one interviewee noted: 
What is missing and what is really a shame is that Marion Labs created, I call it the 
Microsoft events. If you look around the parking lot of Microsoft in Seattle, [you see] all 
these really nice cars because half the people in the company are millionaires. Marion 
Labs had that. Unfortunately, it was almost too early. We weren’t ready for it. Right? 
Ewing Kaufman did too good a job in making that happen. So it is amazing, you will still 
find Marion people, but they are scattered all over the country. So when they came out, 
and let’s say somebody had an idea and wanted to make something happen, [they] 
struggled for years to get enough funding and how [they have] been able to keep that 
going is a miracle. (Venture Capitalist 2)   
Yet Marion Laboratories left a mark on the region’s entrepreneurial community. Life 
sciences firms such as ImmunoGenetix, RxCCI, CyDex, and Medi-Flex (since 2006 
known as Enturia) were successfully started by former Marion employees and therefore 
have their genealogical roots in the Marion Laboratories. With the establishment of the 
Stowers Institute for Medical Research in 2000, policymakers and industry 
representatives hoped to reenergize the region’s life sciences industry. However, with 
its focus on “basic biomedical research in genetic model organisms as a way to 
understand the molecular mechanisms underlying human health and disease” (Stowers 
Institute for Medical Research, 2012), Stowers is not oriented toward producing 
entrepreneurs and spin-offs—something that also was lamented by various interview 
partners. A few firms were founded by scientists working for Stowers, but these firms 
were created not because Stowers is actively supporting entrepreneurship but because 
Stowers’ culture seems not to allow the simultaneous pursuit of basic research and 
commercialization through spin-offs and therefore pushed those interested in pursuing 
an entrepreneurial career outside the organization: 
[They] came out of Stowers. But [they] had to come out to get anything done … [they] 
had to spin out, it was in spite of Stowers. That one [Stowers] isn’t doing anything. The 
universities are trying to do better. (Entrepreneurial Support Organization Manager 5) 
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Among the technology and telecommunications firms in Kansas City, Cerner, Garmin, 
and Sprint stand out as large and relatively dominant firms in their respective sectors. 
Interviewees agreed that these firms have a limited track record in spinning off 
entrepreneurial ventures and mentioned only a few examples (i.e. Tradebot Systems as 
a successful venture developed by a former Cerner employee). Local venture capitalists 
interviewed for this research have not had much contact with employees from these 
large firms who are interested in starting an entrepreneurial venture, as the following 
quote illustrates: 
Garmin. […] The number of people I know from Garmin? I know no one. Not one. There 
was a guy that moved here three years ago and he connected with me because he was 
going to Kellogg. … Garmin started off way too late. […] [E]ven though I liked this guy, I 
didn’t think it was going to be that successful. But he is the only guy that ever called me 
from Garmin. It is not that, I know no one else. I never see these guys out. I don’t know 
anything about what they are doing. I’ve never seen them in the community. (Venture 
Capitalist 2)  
Kansas City’s large and dominant firms do not play an important role as incubators of 
startups. A few employees of these large firms have started entrepreneurial ventures, 
but one cannot speak of a continuous pipeline of entrepreneurs originating from these 
firms that would fuel Kansas City’s startup community.  
Large Firms as Stable and Successful Employers 
What are the reasons why these large firms do not play an important role as 
incubators? Firms like Sprint, Cerner, and Garmin seem to offer their employees a 
stable and secure work environment. With the exception of Sprint, the large IT firms 
have not undergone major corporate restructuring or crises, and firms like Cerner 
provide an exciting work environment where talented employees can grow and develop. 
Large firms provide their employees good development opportunities, which in turn limit 
the negative push effects that often motivate employees to leave their firm and start 
their own business. Large firms also seem not to proactively support spin-off activity. 
This would not be in their interest because spinning off a firm generally might imply the 
loss of capacities and ideas. These specific firm characteristics may play a role in 
explaining limited entrepreneurial dynamics around large firms.  
But I would say we do see individuals that leave those companies, wanting to do 
something on their own, but it is not intentional. There is nothing programmatic about it, 
there is nothing that’s designed. It is all ad hoc and it is generally somebody who comes 
out of Sprint at forty-five or fifty. Where else am I going to get a job that pays like Sprint, 
nowhere in the region! So I either leave or maybe I will hang a shingle out and do some 
consulting or some contracting or maybe I can get a few people together, my friends, 
and maybe we can figure out something to do. So we had a few of those. … But Sprint 
pays well and you get a lot of good training at Sprint, they move you around and you 
learn a lot of different things. So if you are anybody that stays there for any period of 
time, as far as I can tell, you get a lot of experience, project management, they might 
move you into finance, they might move over here to operations and products, so you 
get a lot of different perspectives. (Entrepreneurial Support Organization Manager 5) 
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Large firms like Cerner also are exciting work environments because they are growing 
and are in fields that offer plenty of opportunities, as the following quote suggests: 
Cerner is there, they are growing so much now that healthcare is changing. It’s helping 
their business and they are expanding and growing and they are developing their own 
people and are keeping many of them.  
(Entrepreneurial Support Organization Manager 5) 
Entrepreneurial dynamics in the form of spin-offs from large firms seem to be limited 
during times of stable and growing development. Data about spin-offs in the Seattle 
region illustrate, for example, that spin-off activity emerging from Amazon.com was 
limited during times of growth and only started to pick up speed when the company 
became profitable (Mayer, 2012a). Corporate crises and changes facilitate spin-off 
activity (Neck, Meyer, Cohen, & Corbett, 2004) as we noted for the case of Marion 
Labs. For telecommunications and technology firms like Sprint, Cerner, and Garmin, 
corporate development seems to retain potential employees inside their own 
organizational boundaries. 
 
Benefits from the Presence of Large Firms 
Interviewees noted a few benefits that arise from the presence of large hub firms. One 
important benefit large firms offer a region like Kansas City is related to human capital. 
Large, successful firms and research organizations attract and develop skilled talent. 
Start-up firms benefit from the specialized labor pool created by these large firms and 
organizations. This becomes obvious when we consider the following story conveyed by 
a life sciences entrepreneur: when the startup presented a drug they developed in 
Kansas City to a global pharmaceutical company, the company’s CEO became angry 
because his staff had tried to develop a similar type of drug for years and he could not 
believe how a small startup from Kansas City with only four scientific staff could develop 
such a product. The entrepreneur explained that the scientific staff working on the 
development was top-notch because they had been recruited from the Stowers Institute: 
Three of the four scientists were from Stowers. … Two were Stowers post-docs, who 
were finishing, so they came to Kansas City to do a post-doc at Stowers, you know 
world class scientists. They liked Kansas City and wanted to stay. And one was a 
trailing spouse of a Stowers member. So three of the four scientists were affiliated with 
Stowers. So that helped really [our company] at the time. Stowers never directly helped 
us in any way and we never had any formal relationship with them but we needed a 
small high-quality scientific team and every year they graduate all these post docs and 
unfortunately a lot of them leave Kansas City because there aren’t enough biotech jobs, 
but all of them, if [this large pharmaceutical firm] buys [our company] … each of those 
four scientists will be millionaires, which is great. (Life Sciences Entrepreneur 3) 
Large firms attract and develop talent, which can be accessed by local startups. Once 
this talent is recruited to a second-tier region like Kansas City, the likelihood of retaining 
these talented people is much greater, as the following quote suggests:  
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I think there is talent here. And I think that having companies like Cerner and Sprint and 
Adknowledge and H&R Block, they are cranking out good people. And they do a good 
job training people. First of all, they hire smart people and then they do the job training 
so that’s really kind of the training ground for many people that can come here. … Then 
you get them and one of the good things is that they don't leave, they don’t job hunt that 
much. (Technology Entrepreneur 8) 
However, the creation of a specialized labor pool by these large firms and research 
organizations is a double-edged sword. Some interviewees lamented the fact that a 
great amount of talent (technical, managerial, sales, etc.) seems to be stuck inside 
these large organizations and therefore is not available to entrepreneurial startups. This 
in turn may be related to the sentiment of interviewees that there is a significant lack of 
skilled talent in the region, particularly talent able to execute business ideas and 
develop technical products (i.e. sales managers, software developers, etc.).  
Interactions Between Large Firms and Entrepreneurial Startups 
Some of the quotes cited above, however, also allude to the theme of networking and 
collaboration among startups and large firms. Many interview partners noted that 
Kansas City’s large firms and organizations do not cooperate much with entrepreneurial 
startups: 
… None of the big corporations in Kansas City seemed to be willing to do business with 
startups. (Technology Entrepreneur 9) 
This may be the case for several reasons. The region’s large firms often do not know or 
are not aware of the capacities and potential of local startups. In other cases, large firms 
also might be skeptical of local startups’ capacity, as the following example suggests: 
So I think that [the] Sprint relationship is really important for us and just generally in a 
smaller market, in a secondary market, the fact that Sprint is here. There is a little bit a 
double-edged sword because at times we've gone in to Sprint and say ‘hey this is the 
best thing for you’ and they say, ‘how can that be, you are from Kansas City!’ You know, 
we want work with the Silicon Valley, or whatever. So it’s a little bit, well that’s too 
convenient, you know, you better look around a little bit more. (Technology 
Entrepreneur 8) 
Yet individual examples of successful cooperation highlight the positive aspects of 
networking. As the following quote from a technology entrepreneur suggests, there is 
great potential for startups in connecting with the region’s large firms:   
Sprint was of course the natural customer for what we were trying to build. We didn't 
build [our product] for Sprint, but we really thought that Sprint is what can make it 
successful and we were right. Once Sprint picked it up we had millions of customers, 
and we really, really did well. So we persuaded Sprint as a partner to distribute our 
product and then over the years, that was starting in 2003–2004, over the years, you 
know we just have built so many relationships with Sprint. So right now my CEO is an 
ex-Sprint guy, my CFO is an ex-Sprint guy, the president of [name of division], which is 
our new social media division, was at Sprint at one point. So a lot of guys that—and that 
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might seem odd, but actually in Kansas City it’s not, because those are the guys who 
have the wireless experience. … So Sprint is great training ground for people. 
(Technology Entrepreneur 8) 
Apart from Marion Laboratories’ role as an incubator of spin-offs, the role of large firms 
in the Kansas City entrepreneurial community is limited. Large firms do not spin-off 
many startups. They also cooperate and connect with the local startup community only 
sporadically. Business relationships between local startups and large firms like Sprint, 
Cerner, Garmin, etc. seem to develop by coincidence. The large firms therefore do not 
function as focal points (Menzel & Fornahl, 2009) in Kansas City’s emerging industry 
clusters. 
5.2 Entrepreneurial Recycling 
Corporate changes such as mergers and acquisitions can trigger a process of 
“entrepreneurial recycling” (Mason & Harrison, 2006). After an exit, entrepreneurs may 
use the financial resources they gained to start new firms or invest in existing startups. 
Some scholars also have argued that they become engaged in a variety of ways in the 
entrepreneurial community and share their experience and expertise with other 
entrepreneurs (Bahrami & Evans, 1995; Feldman, Francis, & Bercovitz, 2005; Mason & 
Harrison, 2006). Regions—particularly economically lagging or second-tier regions—
may benefit from entrepreneurial recycling through either the addition of new startups or 
activities that help strengthen the entrepreneurial support system (which may lead to 
“institutional thickness,” see Keeble 2000).  
Data about mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in health care and life sciences, 
technology, telecommunications, and media, as well as animal health-related sectors, 
show that M&A activity in Kansas City substantially increased between 2009 and 2011 
(see fig. 1). In 2009, only seven mergers and acquisitions took place. By 2011, this 
number had increased to twenty-six.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21 
 
Fig. 1: Number of Mergers and Acquisitions by Sector in Kansas City, 2009–11 
 
Source: CC Capital Advisors (2009, 2010, 2011). 
Note: Data for 2012 is still incomplete and not included in this figure. 
 
Interview partners confirmed this trend and spoke positively about the role of 
entrepreneurial recycling: 
Certainly, there have been some exits in Kansas City. So, there is some money that is 
recirculating. (Entrepreneurial Support Organization Manager 5]) 
There are a lot of exits that occur under the radar from the national scene, guys who 
made a lot of money, right now. We don’t have the Facebooks, but we had a dozen 
guys selling 100 million dollar businesses. (Technology Entrepreneur 5) 
Entrepreneurial exits are well regarded among Kansas City’s entrepreneurial 
community. The majority of the interview partners highlighted the benefits of these exits. 
In most cases, interview partners were able to recall several entrepreneurs who had 
sold their companies and who now are reinvesting their funds, starting new companies, 
and/or becoming engaged in entrepreneurial support initiatives. Examples that were 
mentioned included firms like Archer Technologies, VinSolutions, and Zave Networks in 
the information technology sector and Medi-Flex in life sciences.   
Recycling Capital and Investing in Subsequent Ventures and Raising Funds 
Entrepreneurial exits do not weaken the Kansas City economy through, for example, a 
takeover by a nonlocal firm. Instead, these exits can spur regional development through 
reinvestments of the newly acquired wealth in new ventures. Through the financial 
resources entrepreneurs gain, they are able to engage in new business activity and may 
even become serial entrepreneurs: 
We used our severance basically to get the company started and then we subsequently 
have raised 5.375 million of financing. (Life Sciences Entrepreneur 3) 
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Such serial entrepreneurs also are more likely to raise additional funds from investors:  
It’s been a lot easier to raise money having [our previous venture] be perceived as a 
success, although we have not seen the phase two data and therefore we don’t know 
whether [our company will be acquired]. It’s widely perceived as a success. And so 
being a serial entrepreneur has made it easier to raise money, people have some trust 
in you, and they sense you know what you are doing because you have done this 
before. (Life Sciences Entrepreneur 3) 
A proven track record, which helps raise additional funds, might be more important to 
entrepreneurs located in second-tier regions as compared to those located in 
technology centers like Silicon Valley.  
Entrepreneurs Who Exit Become Engaged 
A second benefit resulting from entrepreneurial exits relates to the role of the 
entrepreneur in the community. Mason and Harrison (2006) note that entrepreneurs 
become engaged in the local community, support the entrepreneurial infrastructure, 
may endow community activities and institutions, and may invest their time in civic 
activities. Interview partners perceive that the Kansas City entrepreneurial community 
benefits from entrepreneurial recycling through these activities:  
So they are going to do their own thing or they try to help somebody else. 
(Entrepreneurial Support Organization Manager 5) 
Specifically, entrepreneurs have become engaged in initiatives and programs, such as 
the Pipeline program, aimed at mentoring, networking, and coaching entrepreneurs. 
Entrepreneurs also have become active in terms of optimizing the state of Kansas’ 
angel tax program by forming an online exchange system that would allow out-of-state 
investors to benefit from these tax credits. Others have started their own venture capital 
funds or turned to angel investment groups to reinvest their funds in regional startups.  
Entrepreneurial Recycling Is Just Beginning 
While the data shows that entrepreneurial recycling takes place, the process is just 
beginning.  
I have seen things improve in technology for example in the last you know, I guess 
fifteen years. … I don’t think we ever going to catch up to California or New York in 
terms of being a tech hub, I don’t think. But if we were to catch up, what [it] is going to 
require is this very, very slow process of people like me making an exit and reinvesting. 
And you got to have, and what I’m seeing is the number of successes here, each year, 
are, you know, few and far between. And so you know, whereas on a daily basis you 
have got people exiting for fifty [to a] hundred million every day in California and those 
people reinvesting. You know, there is only one, hundred million dollar plus exit in the 
tech community here, one every couple years. So I don’t even know that all of them 
have reinvested a lot. (Technology Entrepreneur 9) 
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Comparing the Kansas City region to technology centers like Silicon Valley, Boston, or 
Seattle was a common theme in the interviews. Often interview partners argued that 
these centers had a much more vigorous entrepreneurial community than Kansas City.  
Some interviewees noted that these dynamics have not yet developed in ways that 
contribute to a critical mass of both engaged and knowledgeable entrepreneurs and 
startups. One entrepreneur interviewed for this project who received his venture funding 
from outside investors noted that while Kansas City has a few success stories of 
entrepreneurial exits, those entrepreneurs who become engaged as angel investors 
seem to show flaws in their efforts to give back to the community: 
It’s completely immature here in Kansas City and I know that what […] there are some 
great Kansas City success stories, but what you don’t see is them going back to the 
community or them working with the entrepreneurial community. Some of them will have 
large exits and then try to be angel investors, but they are not effective angel investors 
because their nature is to micromanage their investments, just like they micromanaged 
their companies before. (Technology Entrepreneur 4) 
In sum, the data show that entrepreneurial exits in form of mergers and acquisitions 
have increased and a small number of cashed-out entrepreneurs are reinvesting their 
funds and are becoming engaged. However, this process seems to be still in its 
beginning stages. 
5.3 Networking and Collaboration 
Second-tier and peripheral regions often suffer from low levels of interactions and weak 
networks among entrepreneurial actors. Tödtling and Trippl (2005) describe how these 
regions face challenges resulting from the fragmentation of networks and relationships. 
There might be several reasons why second-tier regions experience fragmentation: the 
region might not be home to a dynamic industry cluster (Porter, 2000) characterized by 
extensive supplier-buyer relationships, connections with business support services, 
presence of strong competitors, etc. Even though the second-tier region might be 
specialized in certain industries, the firms located there might not practice extensive 
connections or partnerships with other firms in the region. A second reason why 
second-tier regions face fragmentation is related to the presence and engagement of 
research organizations. Second-tier regions may not have strong universities or 
research institutes. Often these organizations are less specialized and may not have 
strong relationships with the region’s firms and industries. This “thin” institutional 
environment may limit second-tier regions.  
However, research also has shown how second-tier regions have overcome 
fragmentation. Portland, Oregon, for example, successfully developed specialized high-
tech industry clusters because large firms seeded the region with entrepreneurial spin-
offs and attracted specialized suppliers and customers. In addition, over time the 
region’s universities and research organizations became more specialized and 
connected to the region’s high-tech industry (Mayer, 2011). 
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Kansas City’s life sciences and technology industries seems to be characterized by 
weak intraregional networking and collaboration. Interview partners were asked about 
the extent to which they partner with other firms or research organizations in the region. 
It was significant that most interviewees hesitated with their answers to this question 
and did not readily recall a list of firms with which they partner. Also interesting was that 
the partnerships that were mentioned, often were not the most significant for 
development of new ideas, innovations, or markets, But rather  firms that provided 
support services (law firms, public relations firms, prototype manufacturing firms, etc.). 
The following quotes illustrate the nature of local partnerships: 
INTERVIEWER: To what extent do you collaborate with other local companies here in 
Kansas City? 
TECHNOLOGY ENTREPRENEUR 5: Not, I mean, in terms of the technology and product, not 
a whole lot because nobody is really doing exactly what we are doing. 
A similar answer was given in this interview: 
INTERVIEWER: When you think about important partners, who are the most important 
partners locally?  
 
TECHNOLOGY ENTREPRENEUR 1: Hmm. [Long pause]. That’s tough. We don’t really have 
a lot of partners, so to speak. We have colleagues that have licensed our software and 
are now taking it to the market. Part of our strategy is, we want to pick strategic partners 
that could take our technology out to the market. Feasibility again, nobody knows about 
[our firm], so I’m not going to get, at least today, it will take a lot of longer to go and 
spread the word about [our firm], but if I can go partner with Sprint or Amazon or 
whoever and have them start off our platform then that is a faster result for us, and 
better and quicker […] so to that end we have got a partner called [Name of firm], which 
is a creative agency […] and so they are strategic partners that's helping us take our 
platform to those companies. We are working with a company in Australia called [Name 
of firm] that has 2,000-plus magazine clients and we have been working for long now to 
integrate our platform with theirs. […] One of our, one key partner is our hosting 
provider, they are not in KC, it's a cloud service provider and we picked simply because 
it’s the lowest cost. I can't really think of any other local partners … it’s a tough question. 
 
The most important partners—those that helped the entrepreneurs with the 
development of a product or a service—most often were firms not located in the Kansas 
City region. The types of partners ranged from nonlocal clients that were critical for the 
development of the product or service to university partners located abroad with whom 
important research was undertaken. Many entrepreneurs interviewed for this project 
noted that their customers were located outside the region:  
Actually we have no customers based in Kansas City. We don’t have a single customer 
here. (Technology Entrepreneur 5) 
The interviews indicate that local partnerships are not very extensive and that external 
relationships play an important role in the development of new ideas, products, or 
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services. While the literature on clusters has placed great emphasis on the importance 
of local connections, external relationships were neglected. However, external 
relationships with sources of new ideas and knowledge are vitally important for the 
development of a region, particularly a second-tier region. These external relationships 
represent “global pipelines” to ideas developed elsewhere (Bathelt, Malmberg, & 
Maskell, 2004). Furthermore, recent research provides evidence of the importance of 
external relationships to innovation: Rodriguez-Pose and Fitjar present data on 
innovation processes in Norwegian firms and show that firms with a greater diversity of 
international partners tend to be more innovative (Fitjar & Rodriguez-Pose, 2011b). 
Moreover, the same team of authors finds that peripheral regions in Norway can be 
competitive and innovative if their firms are able to develop connections to international 
innovative networks (Fitjar & Rodriguez-Pose, 2011a).  
5.4 Venture and Angel Capital Community 
Funding and the availability of risk capital were an important topic in the interviews. The 
majority of the interview partners lamented the limited availability of funding, particularly 
early-stage capital. This was also an important topic in the research conducted in 2006 
(Mayer, 2006, 2009, 2011). Interview partners often compared Kansas City to 
technology centers like Silicon Valley, Boston, or New York. They noted that Kansas 
City, as a second-tier location, did not have a financial community with the breadth and 
depth of these other regions. Some qualified that there is not enough funding for early 
stage investments and that available funds dried up fast. The following comments 
highlight these sentiments: 
[…] Some of the hindrances are that there is not as much venture capital or investment 
funds in Kansas City, than there are maybe in other big markets like that. It’s not to say 
that there is not, there’s money out there, but it’s obviously less than in Silicon Valley or 
other places. (Technology Entrepreneur 1) 
 
We don’t have as much early stage capital or the culture of early stage capital of some 
regions in the country. I wouldn’t say we are the worst in the country, but I don’t think we 
are the best. (Entrepreneurial Support Organization Manager 5) 
[…] We had one outside investor really, my partners and me and one outside investor 
was a financial investor. But we didn’t, we invested maybe three million dollars in total, 
and so then we decided to go out to venture capitalists in 2005 and [the] actually 
interesting from Kansas City we got no invest[ment] at all. And actually the first time we 
raised money in 2000 we got no interest in Kansas City, we talked to everybody. There 
was a, another guy that had actually started on the path together, he was interested in 
mobile too and we worked together and then he came up with an idea […] and I just 
didn’t think it was a very good business plan and I said well, so we decided to split. He 
came out probably six months before us, he started this business six months before I 
started [our company] so he had pretty much sucked up whatever venture capital there 
was. (Technology Entrepreneur 8) 
 
Overall venture capital investments in the state of Kansas grew by 12,1 percent 
annually in the period from 1995 to 2011 and in the state of Missouri during the same 
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period by 2.8 percent. After a significant increase during the late-1990s and early- 
2000s (a period that includes the dot-com-bubble), yearly investments in these states 
have stabilized. The Kansas City metropolitan statistical area saw venture investments 
in the amount of $311,265,600 from 2006 to 2012 (through the third  quarter of 2012). 
Small investment in 2009 shows that the cyclical nature of venture capital investment, 
which the whole United States experienced in 2009, and such cycle becomes more 
prevalent in a smaller geographic scale like a single metropolitan area. Overall, venture 
capital investment in the Kansas City area does not seem to deviate much from the 
nationwide trend, which has been flat since 2002. At the same time, sudden increase in 
2007 indicates that venture capitals do commit large-scale investment when they find 
opportunities in the region. 
 
Fig. 2: Venture capital investments in the Kansas City Metropolitan Statistical 
Area, KS and MO, 2006–2012 
 
Source: PriceWaterhouseCoopers` MoneyTree database 
Note: For 2012, venture investments are counted for first to third quarter of the year. 
 
Second Tier Location Can Be a Hindering Factor in Raising Funds 
The interview partners often noted how being in Kansas City represented a 
disadvantage to them when it came to finding funding for their ventures. Kansas City-
based entrepreneurs interested in raising capital often try to raise capital in other 
markets. However, they experienced difficulty in convincing outside venture capitalists 
of their firm’s viability. Often they face a lack of interest or trust that they can grow a firm 
in a second-tier region like Kansas City: 
For example, we had one venture capital firm who was very interested in the deal and 
we actually did a presentation with them and somehow they, according to what they 
said anyway, they said they overlooked the fact that we are in Kansas City and they 
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said, oh, we just realized that you are in Kansas City we can’t do a deal with you guys, 
you know there is no way we could invest in a company in Kansas City. (Technology 
Entrepreneur 9) 
In addition, local entrepreneurs experience disadvantages because they are offered 
different, often disadvantageous terms by investors who seem to think a Kansas City-
based venture would accept inferior investment conditions. The following quotes 
highlight these difficulties: 
It is a lot more difficult to get interest, because when people hear Kansas City […]it is 
not something on their radar. […]Then you will meet the people that are kind of focused 
on this area, [and] then if you listen to them, they want different terms. So that’s why 
their focus is making deals here, and so that puts [us at a] disadvantage and that’s what 
the expectation is. (Life Sciences Entrepreneur 1) 
So I talked to a few Kansas City investors, and this was after I had already talked to 
Boston and Silicon Valley investors, and it was a […] joke, excuse me, but they were 
cheap, they tried to take too much and they tried to control too much and so I really 
think that they try to take advantage […] And so because we actually wanted to, we 
thought we are a Kansas City company, but the amount of friction that, even the angel 
investors, that it was. So what we did is we just went on, raced on and we were plugged 
into the Valley. There were a few angels there […] and we had a little higher bar being 
in [a] Kansas City company raising money in the Valley, but they knew our background, 
they knew the product we were building, they understood our market potential and so it 
was something that I have done relatively fast. So when I left some room open in our 
first round for a few Kansas City guys and said, ‘Here’s your term sheet, this is what it 
is,’ they tried to make changes. [I said,] ‘No, I’m not changing anything. This is the 
Valley guys; this is what I’m doing with the Valley guys, I have opened this up for you. If 
you [would] like to participate great, if not, go away.’ (Technology Entrepreneur 4) 
Investment Community Is Forming 
Traditionally, Kansas City did not have a strong venture and angel capital community. 
However, since the second half of the 2000s there have been some significant changes, 
particularly the opening of offices of outside venture capital firms and the founding of 
local venture capital offices and angel networks (see Table 3). The majority of the 
venture and angel capital groups formed locally, but some are headquartered in other 
cities and have opened offices in Kansas City. MPM Capital, for example, is an 
internationally oriented life-sciences venture capital firm with offices in Boston and San 
Francisco. In 2010, MPM Capital expanded to Kansas City and renovated a 1920s-era 
colonial home next to the University of Kansas Hospital. Other startups and 
entrepreneurial support programs like the Pipeline program are co-located in this 
building. MPM Capital is building on its track record of investing in local startups and 
wants to expand into industry sectors such as animal health and crop sciences. MPM is 
not the only firm from the coasts looking to invest in Kansas City-based companies. The 
Chicago-based Open Prairie Ventures opened a Kansas City office in 1999, as did San 
Francisco-based Indie Ventures in 2011. Interviewees highlighted these improvements: 
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I think there has been a much better development of organized capital. … On the 
venture side, we still have … well, I was going to say no early stage funding. I would say 
that you could almost say that. MPM Capital moved into the region with some funding 
and they have put some dollars into a company called Aratana Therapeutics, which is 
an early stage animal health company. So, we can’t say there is no funding. 
(Entrepreneurial Support Organization Manager 5) 
 
Table 3: Kansas City-Based Investments Offices, 2012 
Name Type Year 
established 
in KC 
HQ location 
Kansas Venture Capital Venture Capital 1977 Leawood, KS 
Invest America Venture 
Capital 
Venture Capital 1985 Cedar Rapids, IA 
Advantage Capital Partners Venture Capital 1992 St. Louis, MO 
Mid-America Capital Group Investment Bank 1996 Kansas City, MO 
Open Prairie Ventures Venture Capital 1999 Chicago, IL 
October Capital Venture Capital 1999 Kansas City, MO 
BioMed Valley Discoveries Venture Capital 2001 Kansas City, MO 
Midwest Venture Alliance Venture Capital 2005 Wichita, KS 
Mid-America Angels Angel Network 2006 Lenexa, KS 
Centennial Angel Network Angel Network 2006 Columbia, MO 
Mariner Private Equity Venture Capital 2006 Kansas City, MO 
Five Elms Capital Venture Capital 2006 Kansas City, MO 
Angel Capital Group Angel Network 2007 Nashville, TN 
K-State Angels Angel Network 2008 Manhattan, KS 
Women’s Capital Connection Angel Network 2008 Kansas City, MO 
Show Me Angels Angel Network 2008 Lee’s Summit, 
MO 
Open Air Equity Partners Venture Capital 2008 Kansas City, MO 
CC Capital Advisors Venture Capital 2009 Kansas City, MO 
Great Range Capital Venture Capital 2010 Kansas City, MO 
MPM Capital Venture Capital 2010 San Francisco, 
CA 
Indie Ventures Venture Capital 2011 San Francisco, 
CA 
Archer Foundation Venture Capital 2012 Overland Park, 
KS 
Source: Various. 
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In addition, interviewees noted that the region is benefitting from the formation of an 
active angel investment community: 
We have gotten some angel groups going, which we did not have. There was no 
organized angel group in 2005 in Kansas City. … Today there are at least four. 
(Entrepreneurial Support Organization Manager 5) 
This angel community certainly benefits from the activities of successful entrepreneurs, 
who are reinvesting their funds in local startups, as one interviewee noted about his own 
efforts: 
I’m an angel investor in a couple of deals and I’m looking at more. There is a lot of 
activity, I don’t know what it is […] I was just told by a friend of mine, they were looking 
at a couple of different deals now and I said it just seems like there is a lot of activity 
now. Is that because Cerner stock has done well and people at Cerner say ‘okay, my 
options are vested, I will take money off the table and go do my own thing now,’ maybe? 
Or other people that have done a deal, they have been able to exit and now they are 
saying ‘we are going to start another deal.’ So there seems to be a lot of activity, which 
is exciting. So I have hosted a couple of these people coming to me with ideas. It seems 
like every month I can get several people [saying] ‘hey I got this idea, maybe it will fit 
into your technology.’ (Technology Entrepreneur 6) 
These efforts by angel investors are facilitated by the availability of angel tax credits in 
Kansas. These credits were initiated in 2005. Accredited investors receive a 50 percent 
tax credit on their cash investments of up to $50,000 in a certified Kansas business. 
Interviewees noted that the angel tax credit program was very beneficial to their 
ventures. It has been used extensively, and local entrepreneurs have created a tax 
credit transfer system for out-of-state investors. These angel investments often also are 
used in conjunction with venture capital investments and they help local entrepreneurs 
leverage larger deals, as the following quote illustrates: 
But so now what you are hearing is, people are talking about going out and getting 
angel tax credits to spur along their fund-raising and then they go talk to angel 
investors. (Venture Capitalist 2) 
Despite the presence of more investors, the region still does not have a well-functioning 
investor network. Interview partners agreed that the capital community is not well 
connected. Only a few individuals are well connected in terms of their fiduciary ties with 
local firms, so-called “dealmakers” (Feldman & Zoller, 2012). In addition, the fragmented 
network also implies that entrepreneurs interested in seeking external funding do not 
find great diversity in terms of funding types.  
The other thing that is missing here is a capital network. So the angel community, we 
just recently met and had this discussion. … I think the capital community is not well 
connected. … If you look at Kansas City and the capital funds we have here, at least by 
stage, the portfolio is pretty—you covered it all. But you can’t go more than one deep in 
any one of those. If you want to do an early stage play that’s probably your deepest 
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area. … So yeah, we are getting broader but still not deep. And that’s the problem. 
(Venture Capitalist 2) 
The fragmented investor community also implies that investments in the form of angel 
capital might not be leveraged by venture capitalists. The following quote illustrates how 
a local entrepreneur compares Kansas City’s entrepreneurial ecosystem with those of 
technology centers like Silicon Valley. 
… In lot of cases where you have a tech-hub, there is also some, or nearby, some 
dominant tech university: Stanford, MIT, you know. They are turning out extremely 
intelligent people that are creative and you couple that with a giant pool of people that 
are ready and willing to invest dollars into lots of companies, as angel investors, you 
know, you really got—and plus then you have the whole ecosystem of venture capital 
firms that follow those angels and here you just don't have that, there is no connectivity 
between angels and venture capital. There [are]really no venture capitalists that invest 
in technology in Kansas City. (Technology Entrepreneur 9) 
In sum, Kansas City still is facing issues with the availability of entrepreneurial funding 
and the capacity of local investors, even though more venture and angel groups have 
established a presence in the region. In addition, the region’s entrepreneurial 
community does not exhibit strong networking and collaboration.  
5.5 Entrepreneurial Culture and Support Infrastructure 
Despite issues around weak capital formation, Kansas City seems to have developed a 
culture more supportive of entrepreneurial attributes such as risk taking and tolerance of 
failure. Many interviewees noticed the development of a broader entrepreneurial culture 
and greater energy around self-employment. They not only mentioned individual 
entrepreneurs as examples of this culture, but also noticed a general shift in society 
toward greater acceptance of those who take the risk to become self-employed. Often 
they mentioned that the Kansas City community seems to exude greater energy around 
entrepreneurship, which they also attributed to initiatives and programs such as Startup 
Weekend or the Kauffman Foundation’s 1 Million Cups (1MC) that focus on 
entrepreneurs and their ideas and increase their visibility in the community:  
The energy is stronger now. There is more of an entrepreneurial culture. (Venture 
Capitalist 2) 
Well, I think there is a tremendous amount of energy and activity now. There are so 
many young people that are either starting businesses or interested in starting 
businesses. They have breakfasts, people just set up this breakfast of like-minded 
people. Just, you know, thirty-something business people, who are somehow interested 
in starting. I was a guest at one of them and going around the room, about half have 
jobs in companies and about half of them start up some kind [of venture] and they are 
sharing ideas and supporting each other. That is just grassroots. There is nobody, you 
know, nobody organizing this—people show up and buy breakfast and talk. I think there 
is a lot going on. So I’m very excited and encouraged. (Technology Entrepreneur 8) 
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One interviewee noted that the energy is supported by initiatives such as Startup 
Weekend and by improvements in the entrepreneurial support infrastructure such as the 
creation of various incubator facilities: 
But there’s a lot of energy, you know, there have been at least four or five Startup 
Weekends […]. There have been one or two seed accelerator programs launched. 
There has also been a whole rash of life science incubation programs that have gotten 
started. So, the Kansas Bioscience Authority has started a life sciences incubator, [and 
the] innovation campus of K-State Olathe Innovation Campus has some startup space. 
KU Lawrence has launched an incubator facility for life sciences companies. KU Med 
Center has a facility. (Entrepreneurial Support Organization Manager 5) 
The quotes illustrate how interviewees talk about the entrepreneurial culture in Kansas 
City. They often use dynamic words such as energy or activity and they highlight the 
vigor of the entrepreneurial community. In particular, interview partners noticed this 
entrepreneurial energy in the technology industry, and to some extent in the animal 
health industry; less so, however, in life sciences. 
Good Entrepreneurial Support Environment is Starting to Coalesce 
Kansas City-based entrepreneurs can benefit from a diverse array of entrepreneurial 
support services. Many organizations provide information and support to those 
interested in starting a business (i.e. KCSourceLink, Kauffman Laboratories for 
Enterprise Creation, Pipeline, Startup Weekend, the various incubator facilities, etc.). 
Previous research (Mayer, 2006), however, highlighted the fragmented nature of these 
entrepreneurial initiatives. Here, the efforts of the Kauffman Foundation in facilitating the 
formation and maturation of these networks should be highlighted. Kauffman was able 
to provide initial funding for some of these efforts, which by now have achieved a critical 
mass. 
Yet some interview partners felt that there are still many, often uncoordinated efforts to 
help and support entrepreneurs. Some used words like segregated, disconnected, and 
siloed when they described the entrepreneurial community in general and also, more 
specifically, the entrepreneurial support infrastructure. They also noted, however, that 
the entrepreneurial community is starting to become more networked and as a result 
more cohesive. Some noted that “the networks are tightening” (Entrepreneurial Support 
Organization Manager 1) and others said that “the networking is getting better” 
(Technology Entrepreneur 2). Some attributed these changes to the existence of more 
initiatives that highlight and network entrepreneurs and to an increase in efforts that 
bring different parts of the community together. They particularly mentioned initiatives 
such as the Pipeline program, Startup Weekend, the Greater Kansas City Chamber of 
Commerce “Big 5” ideas, and the Google Fiber initiative, as well as others. 
Interview partners appreciated the excitement around these initiatives and value their 
contributions. In particular, they value efforts focused on highlighting entrepreneurs and 
their ideas, which for example is accomplished by the Startup Weekend initiative. They 
also noted the benefit of networking and bringing people together through programs like 
Pipeline. Initiatives like Google Fiber or the Big 5 ideas also were mentioned as 
32 
 
opportunities that bring together various constituents of the entrepreneurial community. 
While Google Fiber was not seen as a critical factor that would improve the bottom line 
of their business ventures, entrepreneurs mentioned the indirect benefits it would bring 
to Kansas City’s reputation by creating general excitement around technological 
improvements and investments.  
The Pipeline program especially was highlighted by various entrepreneurs interviewed 
for this research. Several of the interview partners who received external funding went 
through this program and described their experiences, noting that programs like 
Pipeline help them become better connected to the entrepreneurial community. These 
initiatives not only provide informal connections, but also imply tangible benefits such as 
getting referrals to support services including human resource firms, law firms, or public 
relations agencies: 
I was green and did not know a lot of people when I started Pipeline. (Technology 
Entrepreneur 7) 
I talk to a lot of my Pipeline alumni about little things, you know, how much you pay this 
type of guy, who is a good accountant? Those kinds of operational things […]. 
(Technology Entrepreneur 5) 
One interviewee said that the Pipeline program not only connects entrepreneurs but 
also helps keep them in the region. He sees the network’s potential to increase the 
region’s “stickiness” because those entrepreneurs who are rooted and connected in the 
business community because of Pipeline may be less likely to leave: 
One of the things I like about the Pipeline network is that it increases the region’s 
stickiness, because if you are leaving your friends and your children’s school and 
maybe your family, that’s hard enough, but […] you [also] are leaving this extended 
Pipeline business network. I find that the Pipeline folks have stayed around more than I 
would say a random sampling of unaffiliated entrepreneurs, because you have this 
extended network and leaving that is hard. (Life Sciences Entrepreneur 3) 
Pipeline also encourages entrepreneurs to become active in the community: 
INTERVIEWER: Have you become as a result of Pipeline more active in the community 
yourself, either maybe through investing in companies or joining whatever groups? 
TECHNOLOGY ENTREPRENEUR 7: Yes. Yes, there are some very strong relationships I 
have with Pipeline people. I have not invested in a Pipeline group but I know that others 
have.  
Kansas City’s status as a second-tier region also may help foster connections and 
networks. Even though interview partners always indicated some envy toward 
entrepreneurial centers like Silicon Valley or Boston, they also expressed appreciation 
for Kansas City and entrepreneurial support programs like Pipeline: 
They have [a] lot of resources here in Kansas City. If you have some idea, you have the 
ECJC—that was a great help. They gave us [a] lot of good advice, a lot of introductions. 
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The Pipeline program was excellent. And it is a smaller community and so it is just two 
phone calls away to meet just about anybody in town. And you look at the investment 
community, the kind of business leaders, they are I think very humble, good people. It is 
way different than on the East or West coast. (Technology Entrepreneur 5) 
Interview partners shared the impression that the entrepreneurial support community is 
coalescing. However, they also highlighted issues that hinder greater integration and 
coordination. Several noted problems arising from the bi-state nature of the Kansas City 
region and the resulting differences in state support for economic development. Another 
aspect mentioned was the political vagaries that jeopardize state-funded programs. A 
case in point is the Kansas Technology Enterprise Corporation (KTEC), a state-funded 
economic development organization, which was dissolved in 2011 and some of its 
programs folded into the Kansas Department of Commerce. Some interviewees noted 
that KTEC functioned as an important connector for the diverse array of entrepreneurial 
support service providers, and that this coordinative role now is missing. KTEC also 
played an important role in offering funding to technology startups and developing other 
types of technology-based economic development initiatives. KTEC’s story highlights 
the vulnerable nature of state-supported programs, which often fall prey to political 
changes. Entrepreneurs interviewed for this project criticized these kinds of 
uncertainties resulting from the political process:   
The network is dead. We talk to each other, we know each other, but we don’t get 
together. … KTEC used to facilitate that. […] Today everybody is looking out for 
themselves and trying to just salvage what they can get. But nothing has been put in its 
place, that’s my problem. (Entrepreneurial Support Organization Manager 5) 
In sum, the entrepreneurial energy and collective effort to improve the Kansas City 
entrepreneurial community has increased and strengthened significantly over the past 
seven years. Various groups and organizations have ensured a thickening of the 
entrepreneurial support infrastructure through the creation of incubators, establishment 
of financial incentives to invest in entrepreneurial ventures (i.e. angel tax credits), and 
adding effective mentoring and networking events. The following quote highlights these 
changes: 
I find that some of the biggest changes since 2005—you know, when we started really 
in 2001 […], there were no incubators, there was no KBA, no Kansas angel tax credits, 
there were no grants at the Missouri Technology Corporation, there was no Pipeline 
entrepreneurial fellowship program, there was no Stowers Medical Research Institute. 
Really the region had a desire, based on the prior Marion experience, to continue to be 
important in life sciences, but post Marion there was really a period where there just 
weren’t resources either public or private, there were no venture capital firms, there 
were no angels investor groups, and if you think about all that, so think about what has 
changed! We now have at least four angel investor groups in the region, we have three 
venture capital firms. Although Kansas City is not their primary headquarters, there is 
MPM, there is Cultivian, and there is Open Prairie Ventures, so there are now three VC 
firms whereas before there were none. There are now KBA-sponsored incubators at the 
University of Kansas in Kansas City, at the Medical Center Campus, there is an 
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incubator here—this is new. There is [also] an incubator in Lawrence, associated with 
the University of Kansas. (Life Sciences Entrepreneur 3) 
6. Conclusion and Recommendations 
The analysis of Kansas City’s economy shows that second-tier regions struggle in 
creating a self-sustaining entrepreneurial community, particularly if they show signs of 
organizational thinness and fragmentation (Tödtling & Trippl, 2005). Kansas City’s life 
sciences and technology industries initially took root because of the presence of large 
firms that in turn functioned as incubators for startup companies. In that regard, Kansas 
City represented a classic hub-and-spoke industrial district. Firms like Marion, Sprint, 
Garmin, Cerner, etc. did have limited interactions locally, and some had limited 
influence on the formation of spin-offs. The analysis shows that the role of large firms as 
incubators has diminished and that connections between existing large firms and 
entrepreneurial ventures are weak. 
Today, however, Kansas City seemed to have changed from a region that is 
characterized by the hub-and-spoke model where the large firms have limited local 
connections to one creating nascent entrepreneurship through grassroots efforts to fund 
and network entrepreneurs. Some entrepreneurs have started to sell their ventures and 
reinvest in local startups. More venture capital firms are present in the region. 
Networking and cooperation among innovators and entrepreneurs is increasing. 
Interviewees positively described the entrepreneurial energy. Despite the fact that the 
large firms are no longer important drivers, the region is starting to create a 
development model that does not depend solely on the presence of these hub 
organizations. Kansas City leaders—including the Kauffman Foundation—need to 
support this emerging entrepreneurial energy and the efforts that are starting to take 
place. 
If large firms such as Cerner, Garmin, or Sprint, and prominent research organizations 
like the Stowers Institute, do not produce a critical mass of entrepreneurs who start 
promising businesses, then the obvious question is where future entrepreneurs will 
come from. Regional leaders need to consider potential sources of nascent 
entrepreneurship. Efforts to improve commercialization and technology transfer 
between universities and industry (i.e. through the Institute for Advanced Medical 
Innovation or the creation of various incubator facilities at the region’s universities) and 
efforts to bring entrepreneurs together certainly will help. Yet if Kansas City wants to 
achieve its goal of becoming the most entrepreneurial city in the United States,3 it needs 
to ensure a steady supply of budding entrepreneurs, particularly entrepreneurs who can 
grow organizations that in turn will be the source of future spin-off companies. As 
mentioned in the beginning of this paper, second-tier regions can follow different models 
of development. They can utilize large firms, branch facilities, or state anchors. Second-
tier regions also can change their development trajectories. For example, if large hub 
firms do not facilitate spin-off activity anymore, a region would need to focus on other 
potential sources of entrepreneurship such as universities or smaller, growing firms. In 
                                                          
3
 This is a goal that was proclaimed in 2011 in the Big 5 ideas initiatives advanced by the Greater Kansas 
City Chamber of Commerce (see also http://www.big5kc.com/). 
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Kansas City, regional leaders have put great efforts into improving the higher education 
system. It would be logical to focus efforts on creating entrepreneurial dynamics around 
the region’s universities.  
Second, entrepreneurial exits in the form of mergers and acquisitions have increased, 
and a small number of cashed-out entrepreneurs are reinvesting their funds and 
becoming engaged in new entrepreneurial ventures. Yet this process seems to be just 
beginning. Entrepreneurs who have successfully exited have great potential to advance 
regional economic development. They start new ventures, invest in startups in the 
region, or become engaged in other forms through, for example, philanthropic efforts or 
advising entrepreneurs. The region needs to embrace these individuals. 
Third, the region’s entrepreneurial community does not exhibit strong networking and 
collaboration. Rather, entrepreneurial ventures and industry connections exist much like 
“islands of excellence” without strong interconnections. Existing networks need to be 
strengthened through regular networking activities. In addition, Kansas City does have 
unique industry specializations (animal health, contract research in life sciences, mobile 
applications, etc.), yet entrepreneurs in each of these areas rarely interact. There might 
be great potential to create innovative synergies if networking and collaboration are 
increased across sectors. One example that has created successful networking among 
universities, research institutes, and a variety of industries is the Oregon Nanoscience 
and Microtechnologies Institute (ONAMI). ONAMI is Oregon’s first signature research 
center, and is supported by the state. The center has been successful at networking the 
various universities with industry partners through shared user facilities, 
commercialization gap funds, and signature researchers (S. Martin, 2008; O’Connor, 
Wood, & Walls, 2008). Key to successful networking was the involvement of various 
public and private partners and the opportunities the center provides for developing new 
ideas and research fields. 
Fourth, although the availability of funding has increased, local entrepreneurs perceive 
the accessibility and availability of funds, and the capacity local venture investors bring 
to the table, as limiting factors. At the same time, while a significant finance community 
is present and the number of investment groups has increased, the investor community 
still is fragmented and not well connected. Capital availability often is perceived as a 
problematic issue in second-tier regions. However, in the case of Kansas City, capital 
availability has improved and, if there are enough nascent entrepreneurs interested in 
receiving external investments, there also will be a process in which potential investors 
and dealmakers become more experienced. Outside venture capital firms have opened 
offices in Kansas City and indicate interest in this market. This implies that these 
investors see the potential of a second-tier market and are keeping an eye on emerging 
ideas. Kansas City leaders need to seize the opportunity and network the emerging 
investor community, or dealmakers, such as venture capitalists, angel investors, family 
offices, and large firm executives, with those interested in starting a firm. San Diego’s 
CONNECT program might provide some example of how these connections are built 
through regular breakfast meetings between industry and the finance community. 
Fifth, the entrepreneurial energy and collective effort to improve the Kansas City 
entrepreneurial community has increased and strengthened significantly in recent years, 
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creating a milieu in which potential entrepreneurs are willing to accept the risk of 
abandoning a stable job in exchange for a more volatile position with a startup. Efforts 
to highlight successful entrepreneurs, network those interested in new ideas (even 
those still working in large firms) and potential supporters and startup investors should 
be continued and enhanced now to build on this momentum.  
The analysis of the data shows that Kansas City faces the drawbacks of a region 
characterized by organizational thinness in the form of weak endowment of firms and 
organizations that can fuel the entrepreneurial pipeline and a lack of interaction and 
networks among key members of the entrepreneurial community, which in turn keeps 
the entrepreneurial economy fragmented. These are typical issues regions that are not 
the proverbial “tech centers” face, and efforts to overcome these challenges that prove 
successful in Kansas City will be applicable to many other communities across the 
United States.  
To combat organizational thinness and fragmentation, this paper suggests focusing 
policy efforts on connecting key actors in the entrepreneurial economy such as existing 
large firms, entrepreneurial ventures, universities, and funding and mentoring 
organizations. The Kauffman Foundation could play an important role as a convener in 
developing these connections, as entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial support 
organizations have repeatedly acknowledged the value of the foundation’s involvement 
in existing programs such as Startup Weekend, Pipeline, and 1 Million Cups (1MC), etc. 
In second-tier regions, foundations like the Kauffman can facilitate networking and 
collaboration because they maintain a neutral position. For example, the Foundation’s 
1MC program, which connects and helps network entrepreneurs, is already a success 
with more than 100 entrepreneurs attending each week`s meeting. The program could 
be extended to also involve potential investors and dealmakers such as venture 
capitalists, angel investors, executives, and others, those working in programs and 
initiatives that provide entrepreneurial support (incubator managers, commercialization 
and technology transfer managers, entrepreneurial support programs, etc.), and those 
working in research institutions.   
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